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ABSTRACT: In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the 
word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or (as in Goddu forthcoming) an act/object ambi-
guity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term 
‘argument’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of 
our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to David Hitchcock, “an argument is a claim-reason complex consisting of an 
act of concluding (which may be of any of the five main types in Searle’s taxonomy of 
speech acts) and one or more acts of premissing (each of which is an assertive).” (Hitch-
cock 2007: 6). In the more technical formulation of the definition, an argument is a set of 
the form {<c, ·: , P>} or {<P, :·, c>}, where, P is the set of assertives which constitutes 
the premises of the argument, the conclusion c is a speech act of any type, ·: is a premiss 
indicator, and :· is a conclusion indicator. A similar definition of ‘argument’ is due to 
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 19-35, 39-46). For them an argument is a constel-
lation of speech acts: “The constellation of statements S1, S2, ( ..., Sn) consists of asser-
tives in which propositions are expressed… Advancing the constellation of statements 
S1, S2, (..., Sn ) counts as an attempt by S to justify [or to refute] O to L’s satisfaction.” 
(1984: 43), where O is an opinion, S is the speaker, and L the listener. 
 Goddu (2009) criticizes Hitchcock’s definition of ‘argument’, not for being ma-
terially inadequate (i.e. failing to capture the concept of argument), but for not fulfilling 
the outcomes that Hitchcock himself thinks a definition of argument should fulfil. In re-
ply to Goddu’s comments, Hitchcock writes that a premise-conclusion complex is not a 
type of discourse, but rather an abstract object: 
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Arguments in the sense of premise-conclusion complexes are better construed as abstract ob-
jects than as acts. Although arguing for a position by giving supporting reasons is an act, its 
content can be the content of other acts, such as collaborative inquiry or deliberation (i.e. co-
construction), explanation of one’s reasons for holding a position, and solo reasoning. Since 
premise-conclusion complexes have properties of theoretical interest apart from their embed-
ding in a communicative or mental act, we should define what it is to be such a complex in-
dependently of any such embedding. (Hitchcock 2009) 
Although Hitchcock abandons the definition of ‘argument’ as a complex speech act, 
many other authors continue to think that there is a place for a definition of ‘argument’ as 
a speech act. James Freeman, for instance, writes: “As is well known, and as Wenzel 
(1979) has pointed out in particular, we may distinguish argument as process from argu-
ment as product.” (Freeman 2009: 1) Ralph Johnson writes:  
The distinction between product and process seems to me fairly secure. It has a longstanding 
history here and in other disciplines. In logic, for instance, the term ‘inference’ is understood 
as ambiguous as between the process of drawing an inference and the inference that results 
from that process. (Johnson 2009: 3)
1
  
The belief common to many philosophers is that ‘argument’ is ambiguous, displaying a 
process/product ambiguity: the word has two literal meanings, one for the process of ar-
guing, and another for the product of that process, which is an abstract object. Goddu 
(forthcoming) offers a criticism of this claim, arguing that the abstract object that we 
name ‘argument’ is not the product of a speech act. So, he believes that we should rather 
talk of an act/object ambiguity, rather than of a process/product one. He does not question 
the claim that ‘argument’ has a sense that refers to an act, and another that refers to an 
abstract object (the content of the act, perhaps). The existence of these two senses, he 
thinks, “warrants holding that the word “argument” is subject to an act/object ambiguity, 
but is not enough to warrant holding that the word is subject to a process/product ambigu-
ity.” (Goddu forthcoming: 8) 
 Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, while we agree with Goddu that ‘ar-
gument’ does not have a process/product ambiguity, we claim that it is also not subject to 
the act/object ambiguity. In particular, we argue that it does not have a sense that refers to 
a kind of speech act. The upshot of this argument is to maintain that a definition of argu-
ment as a certain kind of speech act is not acceptable, because it does not capture a mean-
ing that ‘argument’ has at all. So, in this sense, we take the argumentation up where God-
du left it, and make a further step in criticizing the established view. Second, having 
made the case that ‘argument’ does not refer to a speech act, we propose that it refers to 
an abstract object.  We develop a conception of arguments as abstract objects that can be 
created by human intellectual activity and respond to major objections against this view.  
                                                 
1
  Also van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans write: “Argumentation relates both to the 
process of putting forward argumentation and to its “product,” and the term argumentation covers the 
two of them.” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002: xii) For more references to simi-
lar claims see Goddu (forthcoming) 
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2. THE ACT/OBJECT AMBIGUITY 
It is a classical claim in philosophy that some words display the so-called ‘act/object’ 
ambiguity. Paul Grice in ‘Meaning’ (1957) writes that, “‘utterance’ … has a convenient 
act/object ambiguity.” Terms like ‘belief’, ‘thought’, ‘perception’ also have been said to 
be ambiguous in the same way, having one meaning that refers to an act of perceiving, 
thinking, uttering something, and a different meaning which refers to the object, or con-
tent, of that act: that which is uttered, that which is perceived etc (see MacFarlane 2007). 
For this reason Sellers (see Sellars 1956) called it the ‘ing/ed’ ambiguity. Alan Reeves 
observes that the ambiguity is a common feature of words that end in ‘ment’ and ‘ing’ 
(see Reeves 1975: 235). Other words that have been claimed to be ambiguous in this way 
are ‘statement’, ‘singing’, ‘weaving’ (Reeves 1975), ‘building’, ‘shot’, ‘writing’, ‘infer-
ence’, ‘statement’, ‘thought’ (Bach 1998), ‘assertion’, ‘judgment’, ‘representation’, ‘ac-
tion’, ‘endorsement’, ‘imagination’, ‘description’, ‘classification’ (Brandom 2011).  
 The word ‘argument’ ends in ‘ment’ and belongs to the same semantic category as 
some of the words mentioned above. This suggests that it is also ambiguous, having one 
sense that refers to a speech act of arguing, and another sense that refers to the content of 
that act, which is probably an abstract object. In order to answer the question about whether 
this alleged ambiguity of ‘argument’ is real, we appeal to a number of tests for ambiguity that 
have been developed in the literature on ambiguity. Not all tests are easily applicable, but 
some of them offer some reasonable prima facie evidence for an answer to our question. 
 What does it mean to say that a word is ambiguous? Here is one answer: “An 
expression is ambiguous iff the expression has more than one meaning.” (Gillon 1990: 
394). In Bach (1998) we find a similar definition of ambiguity. We are concerned here 
with lexical ambiguity, that is, ambiguity of simple expressions, which have more than 
one literal meaning. The term ‘literal meaning’ is used in different ways in the literature 
on ambiguity, and in semantics in general. Roughly speaking, it makes reference to the 
meaning of words in the lexicon, and whose knowledge is therefore a priori.
2
 These are 
theoretical claims, and so the precise sense in which they are to be understood depends on 
the particular theory of lexical semantics that one considers. 
 Although it may seem that we can intuitively determine whether a word is am-
biguous or not just by applying the definition, this is not so. As several authors point out, 
claims of ambiguity are theoretical.
3
 They are not a direct expression of intuitive judge-
ments about whether a word is subject to an ambiguity or not. Different kinds of semantic 
intuitions competent users have, as well as observations about use of expressions, are part 
of the data that lexical semantics, together with the theory of predication and a theory of 
non-literal use of expressions (pragmatics) have to explain. But the relation between data 
and theory is not straightforward. For instance, when an expression is systematically used 
in two different ways, one possible explanation of this variation is that the expression has 
two meanings that are homophonic, i.e. associated to the same linguistic form. But there 
are other possible explanations that have to be ruled out before concluding that a word is 
                                                 
2
  We sometimes use simply ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’. 
3
  For example, Reeves writes: “So long as we think of judgments of ambiguity… as intuitive… we shall 
be unable to adjudicate disputes over what is ambiguous… They are not to be thought of as we think of 
perceptual judgments. A word does not look ambiguous as a surface looks red” (Reeves 1975: 233). 
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ambiguous.
4
 In general, to say that a word has various uses is not yet to say that it is am-
biguous. ‘Argument’ is sometimes used to refer to a kind of acts, and sometimes to reefer 
to a kind of abstract objects. This observation about the plurality of uses of ‘argument’ 
parallels Donnellan’s observation about the plurality of uses of ‘the’: definite descriptions 
in subject position can be used referentially or attributively (see Donnellan 1966). As 
Donnellan points out (see section VII of Donnellan 1966), a plurality of uses needs not be 
explained by postulating various independent literal meanings, that is, ambiguity. In some 
cases the best explanation could be pragmatic. As tests of ambiguity (some of which are 
mentioned below) show, the word ‘bank’ is ambiguous, i.e. a case of homophony. There 
is no other plausible explanation. But the word ‘chicken’ is not ambiguous, with a sense 
referring to chicken meat and another referring to a kind of animal, although we use it to 
mean the former in the context of a restaurant, and we may use it to mean the latter dur-
ing a visit at grandma’s house in the countryside. Most plausibly, the explanation here is 
pragmatic. Given that the variety of uses is not limited in principle, the correct explana-
tion for some uses must be pragmatic.  
 As Kent Bach points out, in cases in which a use of a word, such as the cognitive 
use of ‘see’ (as in ‘I see your point.’), seems to derivate from another use of the word, 
such as the use of ‘see’ to refer to perceptual experiences, it could be argued that only the 
latter is a lexically encoded sense of ‘see’, while the former results from a pragmatic der-
ivation. Bach notes that “[t]his argument is plausible to the extent that the phenomenon is 
systematic and general, rather than peculiar to particular words.” (Bach 1998) Pragmatic 
phenomena are systematic and general, because they are explicable in terms of general 
rules of rationality that warrant certain patterns of inference, while ambiguities are rather 
accidental and specific to one particular language. The strategy against postulating ambi-
guity was named by Grice the Modified Occam’s Razor: “senses are not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity” (Grice 1989: 47-9). 
 Pragmatic explanations are of various kinds. One line of argument claims that 
literal meaning is actually very abstract, and so the content of an utterance is always un-
derdetermined by literal meaning. Words do not have a meaning outside particular con-
texts of use. There is a determinate content associated with an utterance only when we 
consider a particular use in a particular context. François Recanati and Charles Ruhl, 
among others, defend this contextualist view of literal meaning.
5
 Ruhl writes that most 
words have “only a single, highly abstract meaning… Typically monosemic words have 
the quality of being… unspecified... The important point is that diversity is provided by 
context.” (Ruhl 1989: xi-xii) According to Recanati (see Recanati 2004: 24), in the res-
taurant example a pragmatic process of specification takes place, which takes as input the 
underdetermined literal meaning, and gives as output the contextually modulated, and in 
this case and more specific, non-literal meaning. Apart from pragmatic specification, another 
mechanism that explains the variety of uses of words is metonymic inference. One example 
of such an inference is that in which a word for instrument is used to refer to the agent that 
manipulates that instrument, as in ‘answer the phone’, where ‘phone’ is used to refer to the 
person using the phone.
6
 The so-called act/object ambiguity could be a case of a metonymic 
                                                 
4
  Cruse writes: “We shall adopt a ‘default’ definition and characterise as lexical all ambiguities for which 
there is no convincing non-lexical explanation” (Cruse 1986: 66). 
5
  For criticisms see Fodor and Lepore (1998) and Asher (2007: 24). 
6
  See Ruhl (1989: 69). For a list of metonymic patters that Ruhl considers see Ruhl (1989: 286). 
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inference in which a word that names an object is used to make reference to a speech act as-
sociated to it. This seems to be the case in sentences such as ‘I finished the book.’ 
3. THE USES OF ‘ARGUMENT’ 
Concerning ‘argument’, dictionaries confirm the hypothesis that it has various uses7. 
Leaving aside the uses of ‘argument’ that are irrelevant to argumentation theory,8 the rel-
evant senses are (according to Merriam-Webster online dictionary): “2.a: a reason given 
in proof or rebuttal; b: discourse intended to persuade. 3.a: the act or process of arguing: see 
argumentation; b: a coherent series of statements leading from a premise to a conclusion.” 
 It is 3b that seems to capture the use of ‘argument’ to refer to a speech act, while 
2a seems to capture the object sense. 3a captures the use of ‘argument’ to refer to an ar-
gumentative discussion, or a debate.
9
 It is easy to find examples of ‘argument’ used to 
refer to an abstract object. Consider the sentences: 
(1) Many arguments were given against adopting the proposal. 
(2) Two arguments were presented in the morning session. 
Sentence (1) is true only if at least two independent reasons were given against the pro-
posal, and false in a situation in which the same consideration against the proposal was 
repeated over and over. In general, verbs such as ‘express’, ‘accept’, ‘make’, ‘present’, 
‘suggest’, ‘mention’, ‘talk about’, ‘propose’, ‘come up with’, ‘defend’, ‘think about’, 
‘give’ etc take as their object not a speech act but an informational content. To show this, 
it is sufficient to consider what is it that we count over in situations in which arguments 
are presented (or made, or suggested, or proposed etc) several times, by making several 
speech acts with the same content. It is only acceptable to answer the question ‘How 
many arguments did the speaker make (suggest, present, propose etc)?’ by counting the 
informational content, not the number of expositions made. So ‘argument’ does not make 
reference to a speech act here, but to the informational content. 
 It is more difficult to find examples of the use of ‘argument’ to refer to a speech 
act. Among the examples given in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, possible candidates 
of exemplifying this use are the following: 
(3) They were always getting into arguments about politics. (Merriam-Webster online) 
(4) They settled an argument that started in class. (Merriam-Webster online) 
                                                 
7
  In the line of the observations about ambiguity claims being theoretical, I take it that dictionaries offer 
information about various uses of words, and that they cannot be taken as containing the answer to 
questions of ambiguity. 
8
  Such as “an abstract or summary especially of a literary work” (Merriam-Webster online). There is also 
the sense of ‘argument’ in mathematics, where functions have arguments, and the sense of ‘argument in 
linguistics, where it refers to the various positions that a noun phrase can occupy in a sentence. We will 
use the linguistic sense of  ‘argument’ in this paper, which is not to be confused with the sense we are 
interested in discussing. 
9
  The debate sense of ‘argument’ is emphasized with more clarity in The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language (2003), which mentions as a second meaning “a discussion in which reasons 
are put forward in support of and against a proposition, proposal, or case; debate” as in ‘The argument 
on birth control will never be concluded.’ 
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One cannot get into an abstract object, and abstract objects do not start, so it seems that 
‘argument’ in (3) and (4) is used to refer to an event. However, the event that it refers to 
is not that of expressing an argument, that is, not a speech act. The subject is plural in 
both sentences, but it is not this per se that excludes a speech act reading. The verbs used 
admit of singular subjects as well. However, the sentences can only be judged as true 
with respect to a situation in which the agent (or agents) is (are) engaging in a debate. 
The sentences are not true with respect to a situation in which there is no debate going on, 
just a collective speech act performed by the subjects. The same can be said about: 
(5) She won the argument. 
To win an argument is not to win a speech act of arguing, but a certain kind of dispute or 
debate. In all these examples, ‘argument’ is used to name a discussion in which argu-
ments are used. We are not taking a stand here on whether ‘argument’ is really ambigu-
ous between a debate meaning (as in 3, 4 and 5) and an object meaning (as in 1 and 2). 
But even if it is, this ambiguity does not look like an act/object ambiguity, because a de-
bate is not an act, not even a complex act. It is rather to be equated with a series of speech 
acts performed by different agents, addressed to one another, and in which different rea-
sons are invoked, both in favour and against a certain claim, questions are asked, objec-
tions are raised, clarifications are made, definitions are given etc. Some authors have al-
ready noticed this, such as Wenzel, who characterizes the process meaning of ‘argument’ 
as referring not to a kind of speech act, but “to the phenomena of one or more social ac-
tors addressing symbolic appeals to others in an effort to win adherence to theses.” (Wen-
zel 1979: 84 quoted in Freeman 2009: 1) It may be thought that a debate is still an act in a 
general and loose sense of the term, because it is an activity that various participants per-
form. This claim does not affect our arguments in this paper. If indeed a debate is an act 
then ‘argument’ does instantiate the act/object ambiguity. However, our claim is only that 
‘argument’ does not name a kind of speech act by which premises are put forward in sup-
port of a conclusion, as in the definitions due to Hitchcock and van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst that we mentioned in the beginning. We are only denying that ‘argument’ 
instantiates the speech act/abstract object ambiguity. This claim is independent of the 
claim that it instantiates the debate/abstract object ambiguity, and for that matter, of the 
claim that the latter ambiguity is also of the act/object type.  
 Sentences (3) and (4) exemplify the debate sense of ‘argument’, and so the Mer-
riam-Webster dictionary fails to provide examples of the speech act use. However, ‘ar-
gument’ can be used to refer to a speech act by which arguments (in the object sense) are 
conveyed. Here are some examples: 
(6) The argument began at 5pm. 
(7) The argument lasted for five minutes 
(8) That was such a long argument. 
(9) The argument was interrupted by the fire alarm. 
All these sentences have at least one reading, which is about a speech act or a series of 
speech acts in which an argument is put forward (but not only one reading, because the 
debate sense of ‘argument’ allows for a different event reading). So ‘argument’ is some-
times used to refer to a speech act. Is this use to be accounted for by postulating a literal 
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meaning of ‘argument’ as a name of a kind of speech act? In finding the answer to that 
question we appeal to some tests for ambiguity. 
4. TESTS FOR AMBIGUITY 
Here are three tests for ambiguity present in the literature to see whether the use of ‘ar-
gument’ to refer to an abstract object, and its use to refer to the speech act of expressing 
that object correspond to two different meanings of the word. One test mentioned by 
Cruse (1986: 58-9) is known as the test of the superordinate sense: if a word is ambigu-
ous, then the meanings that it has do not arise out of pragmatic factors that modulate the 
way the word is interpreted, but are conventionally associated with the word. Here is 
Asher’s presentation of this test:  
“If we can find an expression that expresses the same content as a particular word, but the de-
feasible inferences associated with the word disappear when we employ the other expression, 
then this is a strong indication that the inference is in some way conventionally associated 
with the word as part of the linguistic system.” (Asher 2007: 22-3)  
For example, 
(10) Arthur washed and polished the car. (Cruse 1986: 58) 
(11) John lubricated the car. (Cruse 1986: 58) 
usually conveys the content that only the exterior was washed and polished, and that the 
engine, or some other internal part, is what is lubricated. If we replace the word with a 
synonym or paraphrase, such as ‘automobile’, the two readings are still available. So the 
different uses of ‘car’ in (10) and (11) are not different meanings of an ambiguous word. 
The explanation should rather be non-lexical, a case of pragmatic modulation, for in-
stance. But now consider:  
(12) Her husband is the manager of a local bank. (Cruse: 1986: 59) 
(13) At this point, the bank was covered with brambles. (Cruse 1986: 59) 
There is probably no expression that could replace ‘bank’ in both sentences such as to 
preserve their meaning. One candidate could be ‘place’, but replacing it in the two sen-
tences, we cannot get the initial readings. So ‘bank’ is prima facie ambiguous, according 
to this test. The process that the context performs on the words is that of a selection of 
one of the literal meanings of the word. The context acts simply as a filter. But with the 
former pair of sentences the context does not merely select a meaning, but a productive 
process of enhancing, specifying, or in some other way modulating a pre-existent lexical-
ly encoded meaning takes place (see Cruse 1986: 50-2). 
 What about ‘argument’? The following sentences have the abstract object read-
ing, the written text reading, and the speech act reading, respectively: 
(14) The argument had two premises. (abstract object) 
(15) The argument is on page 100. (written words that contain the argument) 
(16) The argument was in English. (speech act) 
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Can we find a paraphrase such that replacing all the above occurrences of the word ‘ar-
gument’ the two sentences can be used to mean the same as before the replacement? One 
candidate seems to be ‘the defence of the claim’: 
(14a.) The defence of the claim had two premises. 
(15a) The defence of the claim is at page 100. 
(16a) The defence of the claim was in English. 
The initial readings of (14), (15) and (16) are recoverable, which means that ‘argument’ 
fails to be ambiguous in the intended way, according to this test. 
 A second test we will use is the test of contradiction (Gillon 1990: 407, Asher 
2007: 64), or the alternate truth value judgment test (Gillon 2004: 161). Like the above, it 
only provides prima facie evidence for ambiguity. If a sentence is ambiguous then, “[f]or 
a given state of affairs, the sentence can be both truly affirmed and truly denied” (Gillon 
1990: 407).
10
 According to this test, the following sentences are ambiguous: 
(17) Ferrell has a drink each night before going to bed. (Gillon 1990: 407) 
(18) Chunka hit a man with a stick. (Gillon 1990: 407) 
(17) can be truly said of Ferrell if he has a glass of milk before going to bed, but it can 
also be judged as false because he does not have an alcoholic drink. And (18) is judged 
true if Chunka used a stick to hit a man, but also as being false, because Chunka did not 
hit a man that was carrying a stick. The test does not determine which is the source of 
ambiguity, whether it is lexical, as it seems to be in (17), or structural, as it seems to be in 
(18). Now consider: 
(19) John and Bill had an interesting argument. 
According to this test, sentence (19) is ambiguous. It is true with respect to a situation in 
which John and Bill had an interesting argumentative discussion; but it is judged false 
with respect to the same situation, because they are not the authors of some interesting 
argument, which they jointly created or put forward. But this does not show that ‘argu-
ment’ has the speech act/abstract object ambiguity, only that it has the debate/abstract 
object ambiguity. It is not clear that ‘argument’ can refer to a speech act in (19). Unless a 
different sentence containing ‘argument’ is found, for which the respective judgements are 
possible, ‘argument’ fails to be speech act/abstract object ambiguous according to this test. 
 The last test we will use is the zeugma test, sometimes also referred to as the an-
tagonism test (Cruse 1986: 61-2), the copredication test (Asher 2007: 65), the conjunction 
reduction test (Bach 1998), or as the predicate coordination test (Gillon 2004: 176). Cruse 
explains the test: “independent senses of a lexical form are antagonistic to one another; 
that is to say, they cannot be brought into play simultaneously without oddness. Contexts 
which do activate more than one sense at a time give rise to a variety of oddness labelled 
zeugma” (Cruse 1986: 61). One version of the test is known as the test of pronominaliza-
                                                 
10
  Reeves offers a criticism of the test. One of its flaws is that indexical expressions, such as ‘he’, or ‘that 
car’ are also deemed ambiguous by this test. However, this flaw does not concern us here, because ‘ar-
gument’ does not seem to be an indexical word anyway. 
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tion or ellipsis (Asher 2007: 64). It makes use of anaphoric expressions such as ‘he’, 
‘she’, ‘it’. Here is one formulation of the test: “Let a be an expression and b be an endo-
phoric [that is, anaphoric] expression such that the denotation of the endophoric expres-
sion is identical with the denotation of its antecedent. Let d( ) and e( ) be grammatically 
congruent expression frames into which a and b can, respectively, be grammatically sub-
stituted. Let d(a) e(b) be a grammatical sentence or a grammatical sequence of sentences 
where a is the antecedent of b. If d(a) e(b) is judged unacceptable, then a is prima facie 
ambiguous” (Gillon 2004: 181). Another version of the test does not use anaphoric ex-
pressions, but focuses on sentences of the form (d and e) (a). The noun a is used as ar-
gument of two verb phrases, which take as argument entities of different types. If the sen-
tence that results is judged unacceptable, then a is prima facie ambiguous. Consider: 
(20) # The newspaper fell off the table and fired the editor. (Gillon 2004: 177) 
(21) # Conrad Black established and carried the newspaper. (Gillon 2004: 177) 
(22) ? Dogs can become pregnant at 12 months, but mature later than bitches.  
(Cruse 1986: 64) 
(23) # The tailor pressed one suit in his shop and one in the municipal court. (Bach 1998) 
(24) # The bank specializes in IPOs. It is steep and muddy and thus slippery. (Asher 
2007: 64) 
(25) Lunch was delicious but took forever. (Asher 2007: 65) 
(26) The book has a purple cover and is the most intelligible introduction to category 
theory. (Asher 2007: 16) 
As example (21) shows, “[t]he subject position is not the only position with respect to 
which conjoined verbs may impose conflicting selection restrictions.” (Gillon 2004: 177) 
The explanation of the oddness, or zeugma, has to do with the fact that verbs impose on 
their arguments thematic roles, meaning that they require that the arguments be concrete 
or abstract, animate or inanimate etc (see Gillon 2004: 168). When these restrictions on 
arguments are not respected the result is oddness or absurdity, as in Chomsky’s (1957) 
famous ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’. The sentence is grammatically correct but 
nonsensical due to category mistakes. Examples (20) to (24) are infelicitous. Verbs like 
‘fell off’ and ‘fired’ can both take ‘newspaper’ as argument, but the same occurrence of 
‘newspaper’ cannot be the argument of both verbs in the same sentence. This is explica-
ble if ‘newspaper’ has two meanings. In (25) and (26) we also have two verb phrases that 
take as arguments different kinds of entities, but the sentences are felicitous. So a differ-
ent kind of explanation is available here, such as modulation of the meaning of ‘lunch’ 
and ‘book’, respectively. 
 It does not seem possible to obtain zeugma with ‘argument’: 
(27) His argument was valid, but was so loud that the dog ran away. 
The predicate ‘loud’ selects for an event of the speech act kind, while ‘valid’ selects for 
the abstract informational object. Still there is no oddness in predicating both of ‘argu-
ment’ in the same sentence. So, ‘argument’ is more like ‘lunch’ and ‘book’, in that it fails 
this test for ambiguity. 
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5. EVIDENCE AGAINST A SPEECH ACT SENSE 
The above tests give prima facie evidence that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous between a 
speech act meaning, an abstract object meaning, and a written text meaning (see example 
(15)). One of these meanings is literal, the others are the result of modulation, or some 
similar phenomenon. But which one is literal? Does the literal meaning of ‘argument’ 
name a kind of speech acts, a kind of texts, or a kind of abstract objects? Nicholas Asher 
proposes a test that is meant to help us decide whether a use of a word is to be accounted 
for by postulating a corresponding literal meaning or not. Asher observes that, when hear-
ing the sentence ‘Nicholas enjoyed a cigarette’, speakers immediately get the reading that 
Nicholas enjoyed smoking a cigarette. Does ‘cigarette’ have the meaning of smoking a 
cigarette? He writes: “Let’s suppose that ‘cigarette’ always has associated with it a possi-
ble event reading. It should then be possible to access that appropriate event reading with 
other predicates that take events.” (Asher 2007: 23) However, with (29) hearers do not 
easily get the event reading in (28). This suggests that the explanation of the event read-
ing of (28) has to do with the combination of ‘cigarette’ and ‘enjoy’.11 
(28) Nicholas’s smoking of that cigarette will begin in 2 minutes 
(29) ?? Nicholas’s cigarette will begin in 2 minutes. 
When applying the above test to ‘argument’, the speech act reading is available with the 
verbs used in (6) to (9), but it is not available with other verbs: 
(30) Where did the argument take place? 
(31) The argument was very loud. 
(30) is not a request for information about where the speech containing the argument took 
place. Rather it is about where the debate took place. And (31) is not heard as meaning 
that the voice of the arguer was very loud when he gave the argument, but rather that the 
dispute was very loud. So, according to this test, ‘argument’ does not have a lexically en-
coded speech act meaning, given that the speech act reading is not available in all cases in 
which ‘argument’ is combined with a verb that takes events as arguments. 
 Further evidence against ‘argument’ being speech act/abstract object ambiguous 
is that ‘argument’ can be used to refer to a great variety of acts and events, apart from 
speech acts. In different contexts each of the following sentences can be used to convey 
contents about a variety of events concerning arguments: 
(32) The argument was difficult. 
(33) The argument took about an hour. 
(34) I enjoyed the argument most. 
Sentence (32) may be used to convey that the speech act of expressing the argument was, 
in some sense, difficult, or that understanding the argument was difficult, or memorizing 
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  Asher argues that it is not the noun ‘cigarette’ that is ambiguous, nor is it a pragmatic modulation on the 
meaning of ‘cigarette’. Rather it is a matter of predication: the verb ‘enjoy’ selects the event associated 
with cigarettes, but other verbs do not.  
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it, or translating it, or evaluating it, or reading it, or spelling it etc. The same observation 
can be made for (33) and (34): there is always an implicit mention of a certain kind of act. 
Moreover, it is not the case that the speech act is somehow the default reading, or even a 
more natural reading. It depends on the context whether the act referred to is a speech act 
or some other kind of act. 
 So, with (30) and (31) we have shown that the speech act reading is not always 
available. The defender of the ambiguity view has to account for this failure, and there 
seems to be no explanation on this view. On the other hand, other act readings are availa-
ble in appropriate contexts, and it seems that there is no finite list of such readings. The 
list of act readings available for sentences (32) to (34) is impossible to specify a priori. 
Why then favour a speech act use as being encoded in the literal meaning of ‘argument’, 
and deny a literal meaning for the other uses? There are two options, it seems: either ‘ar-
gument’ has one sense for each kind of act that it can be used to refer to (acts of transla-
tion, of evaluation etc), and so it has an open ended list of literal meanings, which have to 
be acquired one by one by speakers; or it does not have a literal meaning for any of these 
uses in particular, and so not one for speech acts of expressing arguments. In the latter 
case, there is no speech act/object ambiguity, and the various act readings (i.e. uses of 
‘argument’ to refer to various kinds of acts) are to be explained other than by postulating 
ambiguity. Only the latter option is plausible, because if the list is open-ended then one 
can never have knowledge of all the meanings that ‘argument’ has, and so one could nev-
er acquire linguistic competence with the word ‘argument’. And even if the list were not 
open ended, but only very long, the ambiguity solution is still implausible, because a lan-
guage user will surely get a new reading of (32), say about translating arguments, without 
the need to learn a new literal meaning of ‘argument’ (i.e. the alleged translating act sense 
of ‘argument’). All that is needed is that it be clear in the context that it is a translation of 
arguments that the speaker is talking about when uttering (32).
12
 
 All these observations make it implausible that there is a separate and independ-
ent literal meaning of ‘argument’ that refers to the speech act of arguing, and suggest a 
contextual pragmatic explanation. It is probably the abstract object meaning of ‘argu-
ment’ that gets modulated in certain contexts so as to refer to an event of the kind of a 
speech act by which such an abstract object is put forward. The above argumentation can 
also be made for the use of ‘argument’ to refer to a written text,13 as in (15) above. And 
this is to be expected given that writing a text is a communicative event, as a speech act 
is. Instead of consisting in the physical emission of sounds, an act of writing consists in 
the emission of certain marks on a paper or on a computer screen. The marks on the paper 
are not a token of which the argument is the type, as some might think. They are symbols 
that express the argument, as the sounds of a speech act does. 
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  Moreover, the data from coercion against a speech act/abstract object ambiguity of ‘argument’ can be 
multiplied for other words that belong to the same category as argument, such as: 'explanation', 'exam-
ple', 'description', 'story', 'claim', ‘hypothesis’, ‘prediction’ etc. Arguments belong to the same category 
as the referents of the above words.  
13
  Van Eemeren et al. have claimed that their definition of ‘argument’ “does not only refer to the activity 
of advancing arguments but also to the shorter or longer text that results from it” (van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002: xii). 
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6. DEFINITION OF ‘ARGUMENT’ 
We have shown so far that ‘argument’ does not have a speech act meaning, or a written text 
meaning, but an abstract object meaning. Most probably, the speech act use and the written 
text use results from the abstract object meaning through a pragmatic process of contextual 
modulation. However, we are not committed to any view about how this process takes place, 
or about whether it is entirely pragmatic. We are only interested in the conclusion supported 
by the evidence presented that ‘argument’ does not name a kind of speech act. It follows that 
a definition such as the one in (Hitchcock 2007) or in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984) 
does not correspond to a meaning of the word defined. If an argument is an abstract object, 
and not a speech act, there is no possible definition of ‘argument’ as a speech act. 
 It may be replied that although ‘argument’, as a word of natural language, does 
not have a speech act meaning, the theoretical word ‘argument’ may be defined as to 
mean a speech act. It may be interesting from a theoretical point of view to give a defini-
tion of the speech acts by which arguments are conveyed, and to offer a characterization 
of those acts. Indeed, just because the English word ‘argument’ is not ambiguous in the 
sense mentioned, it does not mean that there can be no interesting theoretical study of 
speech acts by which arguments are conveyed. A definition of ‘argument’ as speech act 
could be useful as part of that study. The theorist is free to choose both her object of 
study and the terminology she wants to use. However, it would be a bad theoretical move 
to use ‘argument’ ambiguously. We could simply have two theoretical terms, such as ‘ar-
gument-o’, to name a certain kind of abstract object, and ‘argument-p’, to name the 
speech act by which the former is conveyed. More importantly, the theorist should not 
confuse her stipulative definition of ‘argument’, corresponding to some interesting con-
cept within the theory, with a characterization of the meaning of a natural language term. 
The theorist is free to define her terms as she likes, but she should not forget that her def-
initions are stipulative. And the disagreement in the literature on argumentation is surely 
not about some stipulative definitions. It is the meaning of the natural language word ‘ar-
gument’ that definitions offered in the literature try to capture, and not the meaning of a 
term within some theory or another. And it is about the former that the claim of an 
act/object ambiguity is being made. If the natural language word is not the name of a kind 
of speech act, then we should not feel tempted to define it as such. 
7. PLATONISM ABOUT ARGUMENTS 
In the remainder of the essay we develop an account of arguments as abstract objects that 
is compatible with our common talk and thought about arguments as things that can be 
produced and as things that can be known. Regarding arguments as abstract objects sug-
gests a Platonism about arguments similar to Platonism about mathematical objects. 
Thus, we begin with an explanation of what Platonism about arguments involves. We 
contend that Platonism about arguments has difficulty addressing the problems of how 
we can produce and how we can know arguments. We propose some modifications to 
Platonism about arguments and call the resulting view realism about arguments. We pro-
vide an account of the identity conditions of argument that shows how arguments can be 
understood as temporal abstract objects that are productions of human intellectual activity 
that we can know. Therefore, we contend that since ‘argument’ does not have a speech 
ARGUMENTS AS ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
13 
act meaning and that an account of arguments as abstract objects is available that can ad-
dress the major criticisms that such a view encounters, there is a good basis to think that 
arguments are abstract objects. 
 Some of the views Goddu expresses in his criticisms of ‘argument’ being subject 
to a process-product ambiguity have similarities to versions of Platonism about abstract 
objects. In his essay on abstract objects Bob Hale (1987) considers his own account of ab-
stract objects to be a form of Platonism on the grounds that it provides affirmative answers to 
the questions: “Are there abstract objects? If there are, do at least some of them, enjoy a 
mind-independent existence? and what sort of knowledge do we have of them?” (Hale 1987: 1). 
 While, as far as we aware, Goddu does not directly speak to these issues, given 
some of his claims in Goddu (forthcoming) there are reasons to think that Goddu would 
answer affirmatively to the first two questions. Firstly, given that Goddu endorses the no-
tion that there is a sense of ‘argument’ that refers to an object, and given that it would be 
difficult to conceive of arguments-as-objects as being concrete objects, we are lead to 
conclude that—unless Goddu endorses a kind of error-theory about statements about ar-
guments
14—then Goddu holds that there are abstract objects that are the referent of 
statements in which ‘argument’ (in its object sense) figures in a singular expression. Fur-
thermore, Goddu says of propositions, they are “abstract objects, either eternal or atem-
poral, and not the subject of production.” (Goddu forthcoming) And, Goddu goes on to 
claim of arguments, in so far as they can be understood as an ordered set of propositions, 
that the “ordered set is itself an abstract object and exists independently of anyone think-
ing of it or creating it, the group is not produced by the act of arguing.”15 (Goddu forth-
coming) Given these quotations Goddu does seem to endorse the idea that there are ab-
stract objects and that some of them, at least, are atemporal and mind-independent. 
 In regards to the third of Hale’s question there are a variety of different answers 
available to it compatible with Platonism. For instance, Traditional Platonists about 
mathematics such as Kurt Gödel famously claimed that while mathematical objects are 
mind-independent we nonetheless have a capacity to become aware of them. Gödel states 
“despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception 
... of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves on 
us as being true” (Gödel 1983: 483-4). And, more recently, Penelope Maddy (1980) has 
proposed a development of Gödel’s view in which sets are objects to which we have per-
ceptual access. Another answer to this question has been advanced by Hale (1987) and 
Wright (1983). They adopt a neo-Fregean view in which numbers are abstract objects, but 
can be known without positing some perception like faculty. Rather abstract objects (like 
numbers) can be known on the neo-Fregean account because the states of affairs that 
make statements about abstract objects true are states of affairs that an agent can have the 
right sort of interactions with to acquire knowledge of them. 
 Given the variety of different answers available to Hale’s third question it is im-
possible to speculate about what Goddu would have to say about how we acquire 
knowledge of arguments in their abstract object sense. However, Goddu’s paper raises, 
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   An error-theory about statements about arguments would hold (i) that statements about arguments are 
true or false but (ii) since no arguments exist any such statements are false. 
15
  Goddu does not claim that this is the right view of arguments. Rather his argumentative objective here 
is to show that a variety of conceptions of argument are incompatible with the idea that arguments are 
produced by acts of arguing.  
PAUL SIMARD SMITH AND ANDREI MOLDOVAN  
14 
even if indirectly, an important question for theorists of argument: “Is a version of Plato-
nism about arguments viable?”   
 One problem that a Gödel-Maddy style Platonism, or as we will call it traditional 
Platonism, about arguments would face is how to reconcile the view that arguments are 
mind-independent and atemporal with a causal theory of knowledge.
16
 A causal account of 
knowledge is one where if the proposition that “X knows S” is true, then “some causal rela-
tion [must] obtain between X and the referents of the names, predicates, and quantifiers of S” 
(Benacerraf 1983: 412). That some form of the causal theory is correct is evident when we 
consider how we challenge the claim “X knows that p.” Presuming that p is true and that X 
has typical inferential abilities in order to establish that X cannot know p we are left to, 
arguing that X could not have come into possession of the relevant evidence or reasons for p: 
that X’s four-dimensional space time worm does not make the necessary (causal) contact 
with the grounds of the truth of the proposition for X to be in possession of evidence ade-
quate to support the inference. (Benacerraf 1983: 413)   
It is not hard to see how reconciling such an account of knowledge is hard to square with 
traditional Platonism. If arguments are atemporal and mind-independent objects it is dif-
ficult to conceive how agents could come to have the appropriate causal interactions with 
such objects that would be necessary to facilitate knowledge on the causal account. Simp-
ly postulating a Gödel-Maddy style perceptual faculty does not do the trick on its own. It 
must be explained how this perception facilitates access to objects that are different from 
the spatiotemporal objects with which we have familiar sorts of causal interactions. 
 Another problem that a traditional Platonism about arguments faces is it strikes 
us as being incompatible with a certain natural way of thinking and talking about argu-
ments. We often make statements such as “Searle developed the Chinese room argument” 
or “Gaunilo formulated a compelling counter-argument to Anselm’s ontological argu-
ment.” We have a strong intuition that there is a sense that through human intellectual 
activity it is possible for us to create and produce original arguments and we often talk 
and think as if this is the case. If traditional Platonism about arguments is true, however, 
then arguments would be mind-independent, non-saptiotemporal objects and this feature of 
them would be difficult to square with the idea that they are creations of the human mind.  
 One possible way of responding to these problems is to adopt a more minimalist 
version of Platonism. Notice that one of the criteria that Hale provides for being a Pla-
tonist is that one endorses the view that some abstract objects have mind-independent ex-
istence. This criterion specifically leaves open the possibility that some abstract argu-
ments might be mind-dependent.  In fact, Hale thinks it is a mistake to presume that un-
derstanding abstract objects as mind-dependent implies that they are mental entities. A 
story, for example, is an abstract object on Hale’s account and in a real sense is a non-
mental yet mind-dependent entity (Hale 1987: 2). Furthermore, Hale is also critical of 
drawing the abstract-concrete distinction between objects that are not spatiotemporal and 
objects that are. Hale states, 
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  This problem is reminiscent of Benacerraf’s (1983) dilemma for the philosophy of mathematics. Bena-
cerraf points out that any account of mathematical truth that parallels our account of empirical truth is 
difficult to square with a causal theory of mathematical knowledge.   
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It is, on reflection, not clear that every kind of abstract object must be both non-spatial and 
atemporal. Consider for example, chess, or the English Language, or any word (in the type as 
distinct from the token sense). These may plausibly, and indeed have been, taken to be ab-
stract objects. No doubt games and languages are non-spatial. The crucial question is are they 
atemporal? It seems not. Chess and English, unlike the natural numbers or sets, have their 
histories. They came to be at certain more or less definite times. (Hale 1987: 49)     
Consider abstract objects for which it does not make sense to ask where they are, or when 
they came into existence. Included in this category are mathematical objects, such as the 
cosine function, or the Pythagorean Theorem. It makes no sense to ask “when did the co-
sine function come into existence?” Now consider the game of chess. Gideon Rosen 
(2001) writes: “Some philosophers take the view that chess is like a mathematical object 
in these respects. But that is certainly not the most natural view. The natural view is that 
chess was invented at a certain place and time.” 
 Thus, Hale at least, holds a minimalist version of Platonism that is not put off by 
the idea that some abstract objects are mind-dependent and temporal objects that are gen-
erated by human intellectual creativity. In order to avoid confusion for the remainder of 
the essay we will call Hale’s minimal version of Platonism about abstract objects realism 
and distinguish it from traditional Platonism.
17
  
 In what follows we propose a realist conception of arguments as abstract objects 
such that arguments are akin to games of chess, musical compositions, languages and other 
objects of that ilk and not to objects like numbers and other mathematical objects. We con-
tend that the realist conception of argument is not subject to the same weaknesses as tradi-
tional Platonism. That is, we think that a realist account of argument is compatible with our 
talk and thought about arguments as human creations and as things that we can know. 
8. REALISM ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
Our discussion of Platonism about arguments leads us to a more exact characterization of 
that position. A traditional Platonist about argument is committed to the following three 
claims; (I) Arguments are abstract objects, (II) arguments are mind-independent, non-
spatiotemporal, objects and (III) arguments are known through a perception-like faculty. 
We saw two consequences of endorsing such a thesis about argument. First, there are 
problems for understanding how arguments can be produced or created by human beings. 
Second, there are problems raised for how Platonism about arguments could be squared 
with a causal account of our knowledge of arguments. In response to these problems we 
said that we will propose a modification to traditional Platonism about arguments that we 
are calling realism about arguments. Realism is only committed to (I) above and not to 
(II) and (III). Thus, in order to defend our alternative we need to make three arguments. 
Firstly, we need to defend (I) with a case for the claim that arguments are indeed a sort of 
abstract object. Secondly, we need to show that arguments are either spatial, or temporal, 
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  Hale states that this species of Platonism “is often labelled ‘realism’” (Hale 1987: 2). Hale adopts the 
Platonist label in order to avoid confusion with the sort of realism that is described by Michael Dum-
mett in (Dummett, 1973, 1991). The subtleties involved in a comparison between semantic anti-realism 
and Platonism, however, is not of concern to us in this essay so we can take advantage of the established 
convention of calling a Hale-like version of Platonism realism.  
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or mind-dependent and can be known in a non-problematic way. That is to say, we need 
to show that realism denies (II) and does not need to endorse (III). 
 What grounds do we have to think that arguments are abstract objects? In the 
first 6 sections of this essay we provided an extended argument for the view that the term 
‘argument’ does not mean a speech act and that it refers to an abstract object, but what 
positive reasons do we have to think that arguments—that is the object to which ‘argu-
ment’ refers—are abstract. One serious difficulty with making an argument that supports 
(I) is that there is no clear and established method of drawing a crisp distinction between 
the concrete and the abstract. One only has to peruse the variety of alternative accounts of 
how to draw that distinction explained in Rosen (2001) or in Hale (1987: 45-67) to see 
the difficulty in clearly specifying the abstract/concrete distinction. However, there is a 
general feature of abstract objects that we think it is possible to show that arguments pos-
ses. By showing that arguments posses this feature of abstract objects we think that there 
is a good basis to regard arguments as abstract.    
 Games, musical compositions, and languages all have their unique histories.  
They develop in time and became the game, score, or language we know today. It is also 
entirely possible that these objects could cease, and indeed some of them have ceased, to 
exist. Thus, on a traditional Platonist model of abstract objects, these entities are not 
properly classified as abstract. One reason to think that such entities are abstract is that 
they can be spatially separated even if they are not temporally separated. The game of 
chess is instantiated in many different regions of space even though the game itself has 
one history. In fact the odds are good that the game of chess is instantiated in several dif-
ferent locations. The same is the case with Mozart’s Requiem. It is also theoretically con-
ceivable, though admittedly highly implausible, that some alien species could have de-
veloped the English language independently of us. English would then be located on two 
different planets. The history of the language would have to accommodate the different 
time lines for its development on the two different planets, however, this would not mean 
that the English language would be temporally separated.  (Presumably we would say that 
English began or came into existence on one of the two planets, then also emerged on the 
other at a latter time). This observation about how to distinguish some abstract objects 
from concrete objects is most clearly visible when considering the distinction between 
type-letter and token-letter. Hale points out that “a cannot be the same token-letter as b if 
a and b have distinct spatial locations at the same time, whereas a may perfectly well be the 
same type-letter as b, though differently located from it.” (Hale 1987: 56-7)  Hale goes on 
to say about this criterion for distinguishing abstract objects from concrete ones that, 
Here we have the markings of a general distinction which respects the large measure of truth 
residing in the thought that abstract objects are non-spatial and atemporal, but which does 
not, unlike that unrefined proposal, fall foul of the fact that some kinds of abstract object are 
not wholly ‘outside’ time.18 (Hale 1987: 56-7) 
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  In spite of this quotation Hale (1987: 57-63) is not satisfied with the simple version of the criterion for 
distinguishing the abstract from the concrete described here. Hale enhances this criterion in various 
ways to avoid the problem of classifying certain obviously concrete relations such as “being the father 
of” as abstract and to ensure that he can include objects such as sets and numbers that are both non-
spatial and atemporal in the realm of the abstract. As far as we can tell these difficulties do not pose a 
problem for our purposes since all of the refinements Hale makes to this criterion involve the notion that 
objects that are spatially but not temporally separated are classified as abstract. Furthermore, on all of 
ARGUMENTS AS ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
17 
There is a natural sense in which arguments fit into this category of objects. When refer-
ring to, for instance, Anselm’s ontological argument, or Searle’s Chinese room argument, 
or my neighbour’s peculiar argument on the immorality of neutering male dogs we are 
referring to one argument that could be instantiated at spatially distinct locations. It is en-
tirely plausible for believers today to offer the same argument that Anselm is famous for 
making sometime in the 11
th
 century. We can even imagine that some arguments have 
ceased to exist. Aristotle is said to have produced dialogues like Plato, but unlike Plato all 
of Aristotle’s dialogues have been lost. It is plausible that contained in those dialogues 
are arguments that have never been expressed elsewhere. Do these arguments still exist? 
It seems not. It is more natural to think of lost arguments like Aristotle’s—and hopefully, 
sooner rather than later, my neighbour’s—as no longer existing. 
9. IDENTITY-CONDITIONS FOR ARGUMENT 
In the last section we made a case for understanding arguments to be abstract objects like 
games, stories, songs, and languages that can be spatially yet not temporally separated. 
That arguments have this trait suggests that they can be instantiated at distinct locations 
and be the same argument. This is not implausible since the content of an argument is in-
stantiated in spatially distinct places when that argument is expressed in different loca-
tions (e.g. the Chinese room argument is found on page 43 in the first edition and page 52 
in the second edition). When Anselm expressed his famous argument the content was 
present for his audience to grasp and the content is present today for a different audience 
to grasp when someone expresses Anselm’s argument today. Moreover, in Anselm’s 
time, the argument was conveyed in Latin, while today it is probably more frequently ex-
pressed in non-classical languages. This raises a question about how we can confirm that 
two different instantiations of one argument are in fact the same argument. In other 
words, what are the identity conditions for argument?  
 As a start to answering this question we will consider the identity conditions for 
argument proposed by Mark Vorobej (2006) and then propose some refinements to them. 
Vorobej (2006: 9) asks us to consider the following two passages that he claims “could 
express the same argument,”  
(A)  5 is a square root of 25. Therefore, 25 is not a prime number. 
(B) 25 is the square of 5. It follows that 25 is not a prime number. 
Vorobej claims that, 
A necessary condition of two persons offering the same argument is that they infer the same con-
clusion from the same set of premises. A further necessary condition is that they employ the same 
inference. (That is, if two individuals argue that the same conclusion follows from the same set of 
premises, but if they disagree about how it follows, then they cannot be offering the same argu-
ment). Together these conditions are jointly sufficient. So the author of (A) offers the same argu-
ment as the author of (B) provided they agree upon how the proposition that 25 is not a prime 
number follows from the proposition that 25 is the square of 5. (Vorobej 2006: 9) 
                                                                                                                                                 
the more developed formulations of the criterion that are discussed by Hale, arguments will turn out to 
be abstract objects.  
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Thus, we propose the following formulation to capture Vorobej’s identity conditions for 
argument:  
Argument A is identical to argument B iff:  
(1) An agent offering argument (A) infers the same conclusion from the same  
premises as an agent offering argument (B). 
(2) An agent offering argument (A) employs the same inference as an agent  
offering argument (B).  
One thing to notice in about Vorobej’s identity conditions is that there are two distinct 
sorts of conditions. There is a premise and conclusion identity condition and an inferen-
tial identity condition. We think that there are problems with both conditions. One prob-
lem that applies to both conditions is that an argument does not need to be offered by any 
agent in particular. Arguments can be mentally entertained without ever being offered in 
any discourse. Moreover, some arguments in a discourse might not be arguments that the 
agent ought to be understood as offering at all. In fact, the agent might fundamentally 
disagree with some argument and have no intention of offering the argument to an inter-
locutor with whom they are having a discussion. Nevertheless the agent may find com-
municative purpose in mentioning the argument. To a certain extent the difference be-
tween mentioning an argument and offering an argument is verbal, but we want to be 
clear that an agent can present an argument without thinking that the argument is one that 
anybody ought to accept. Thus, the identity conditions for argument ought not to be re-
stricted to an agent offering an argument. A second problem is the reference to the argu-
ments premises and conclusions in (1). We want to be clear that it is the propositions that 
compose the arguments that are the same in two identical arguments and, thus, we pro-
pose to replace reference to premises and conclusions with reference to propositions.  
 Finally there is a problem with (2) itself. It is important that the inferential con-
dition is not formulated in a way that is too narrow. In particular it will be important that 
the inferential condition does not exclude from the class of arguments bad arguments that 
have no inferential relation or even a relevance relation (e.g. the red herring fallacy). 
Since in bad arguments an inference may be intended even though none is, in fact, em-
ployed (2) is not sufficient to determine identity in these cases. Furthermore, once our 
identity conditions no longer talk of an agent employing an inference it will be important 
that the inferential condition is not formulated in a way that is too broad. Imagine a story 
in which there are a set of propositions identical to a set of propositions in some argu-
ment. Further imagine there is an inference between these propositions. In the case of the 
story, however, no inference is intended and, thus, there is no argument. It will be an im-
portant adequacy condition of any identity conditions for argument that they do not ex-
clude bad arguments and including non-arguments.  
 What we are after in (2) is some way of capturing an identical illative relation 
between two arguments. The illative relation is expressed in an argument by words such a 
‘since,’ ‘so,’ and ‘therefore.’ However, it is important to note that this relation is not 
equivalent to some subset of words used in expressing an argument, but with the relation 
that those words express. Hitchcock writes that a simple argument is a sequence of three 
objects: "a speech act c of any type concerning some proposition, an illative such as the 
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word “since” (in its inferential sense), and a set P of one or more assertives." (Hitchcock 
2007: 6 talics added) However, the illative relation cannot be one word because some-
times more than one word is used and in other cases no words are used; for those cases 
Hitchcock says: “Arguments with no explicit illative can be regarded as having one im-
plicitly” (Hitchcock 2007: 6). So, according to Hitchcock, there are some implicit words 
in arguments with no explicit illatives. But, if no word was actually uttered, which illa-
tives were implicated? There seems to be no principled way to choose one premise or 
conclusion indicator and not another. Why ought we to choose ‘since’ as opposed to ‘giv-
en that?’ Another difficulty is that it does not make sense to talk of words being conveyed 
implicitly but only of contents being conveyed implicitly. Words are used in communica-
tion to convey contents explicitly. If some words are missing, content can still be con-
veyed, but only implicitly. Another point against saying that the illative relation is a word 
is pointed out by Goddu. Goddu writes that Hitchcock's talk of implicit illatives  
seems ad hoc if the indicators or the illative use of the indicator is supposed to be part of the 
argument. A better account of the fact that there can be an argument, but no explicit indicator 
is that the presence or absence of the illation relation does not depend on the presence or ab-
sence of the indicator. (Goddu 2009: 4)  
We will understand an illative relation as an intended inference relation. That is to say, 
the illative relation is the type of inference that an agent intends to be made from an ar-
gument’s premises to an argument’s conclusion. In less precise terms it is the way an 
agent intends a proposition to follow from some other propositions in an argument. This 
understanding of the illative-relation is due to the observation that a set of propositions S 
becomes an argument just when some subset of S is intended, by an agent, to be inferred 
in a certain way from another subset of S. Thus, we get the following identity conditions 
for illative relations: For sets of propositions S and T, and for propositions p and q, the 
Illative relation I between S and p is identical to the illative-relation R between T and q if 
and only if an agent A intends that p be inferred from S in accordance with the same in-
ference that an agent B intends q to be inferred from T in accordance with.
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 This identity condition for illative relations allows us to capture the intuition that 
two different arguments (say arguments with different premises or a different conclusion) in 
which the premises are intended to classically entail the conclusion according to the same 
inference scheme (say modus ponens) possess the same illative relation. We can also explain 
how two arguments with the same premises and conclusions are different arguments if the 
conclusion is intended to follow abductively in one argument and, say, inductively in another.  
 One thing to note about our characterization of the illative relation is that it does 
not require that an agent has an intention-to-support the conclusion with the premises. 
The reason we do not formulate the illative-relation in that way is similar to the reason 
why we abandoned reference to “offering an argument” in Vorobej’s formulation of the 
identity conditions. An agent can explain or use some argument in a discussion or in try-
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  What makes one inference the same as another is an issue that we cannot get into here and that we will 
have to leave at an intuitive level of understanding. Suffice it to say that it ought to be possible for one 
person to intend that a conclusion follows in accordance with the same inference as another person in-
tends a conclusion to follow in accordance with. There are many interesting complications here, howev-
er. For instance, is a dedicated classical monist using conjunctive detachment making the same infer-
ence as a strict intuitionist using a conjunctive detachment in their favoured systems of logical rules? 
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ing to make some decision without intending to support the conclusion. However, in such 
discussions or decisions the agent still intends that the conclusion be inferred from the 
premises in a certain way. The agent may simply mean to point out that a certain type of 
inference is possible from the premises to the conclusion for the purpose of later showing 
why the inference or the premises are flawed. However, even if an agent is mentioning an 
argument, say for the purpose of explaining it, the agent intends the conclusion to follow 
from the premises in accordance with a certain inference.  
 Given the previous considerations we get the following identity conditions for 
arguments,   
Argument A is identical to argument B iff: 
(1) The propositions that are part of argument A are the same as the propositions 
that are part of argument B. 
(2) The illative relation(s) in argument A is (are) identical to the illativerelation(s)  
in argument B. 
(3) The illative relation(s) in argument A are relations on the same proposition as 
the illative relation(s) in B are relations on.
20
 
Earlier we had said that an important adequacy condition for the identity conditions for 
argument was that they are not too narrow, and do not excluded bad arguments, and are 
also not too wide, and do not include non-arguments such as stories.  These conditions, as 
far as we can tell, satisfy this adequacy condition. In a bad argument an agent will intend 
a certain inference from the premises of the argument to the conclusion. Thus, if someone 
were to intend the exact same inference from the exact same premises to the exact same 
conclusion, then they would be making the same bad argument. Moreover, these condi-
tions do not include stories since in a story no inference is intended. 
 Also note that these identity conditions for argument permit arguments to be 
spatially but not temporally separated. While Vorobej claims that arguments are partially 
abstract objects on the grounds that the propositions that compose arguments are abstract 
objects (Vorobej 2006: 8), in our effort to establish that arguments are abstract we are 
going to focus on the illative relation. We contend that this relation is created by an agent 
when the agent intends that a conclusion follows from a set of premises in a certain way. 
(Another agent gives the same argument when they intend that the same conclusion to 
follow from the same premises in accordance with the same inference.) Consider the set 
of propositions that make up the propositions of an argument. Until there is a specific sort 
of relation formed on that set by an agent intending that the conclusion be inferred in a 
certain way from the premises, then there is no argument. In fact, it is possible that that 
set might never have the right sort of relation formed on it for it to become an argument. 
Let’s speculate that Anselm chose not to pursue a career in philosophy and theology and 
instead decided to enter the lucrative trade of metal crafts. Instead of thinking about the 
existence of God his mind would be occupied with matters less divine. In this speculation 
Anselm never intends an inference from the propositions he used as premises in the onto-
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  The bracketed plurals are intended to accommodate linked arguments that have more than one conclu-
sion and more than one illative-relation. 
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logical argument to the conclusion “God exists.” It would be a stretch to contend that in 
this alternate reality Anselm’s Ontological Argument exists (especially if no one else con-
ceived it). Therefore, we conclude that an argument’s existence depends on an agent re-
lating some set propositions S to another proposition p by intending that p be inferred 
from S in a particular way. And, since this intention to infer comes into existence at a cer-
tain time, arguments are temporal and are produced by human beings. A fortiori, given 
that arguments are formed by human cognitive activity, arguments are not mind-
independent. In a very real sense their existence depends on the mental activity of the 
agents who formulate them. Finally, lest one be concerned that Anselm’s Ontological Ar-
gument be a concrete object this very same argument, as mentioned earlier, can be instan-
tiated today in a place spatially distant from the place Anselm first formulated it. All that 
is required is that some agent intends the conclusion of Anselm’s argument to follow 
from the premises of Anselm’s argument in just the way that Anselm intended it to fol-
low. So, arguments can be spatially separated. We can conclude given the above consid-
erations, and given the criterion of abstraction that understands objects that can be spa-
tially but not temporally separated to be abstract objects, that arguments are temporal ab-
stract objects that can be created by the human intellectual activity.  
 Notice that we have now addressed the worry that an account of argument as 
abstract object could not fit with our talk of arguments as human intellectual creations or 
productions. On our account, arguments are created when an agent forms an intention to 
infer, in a certain way, a proposition from some other propositions. Thus, on our concep-
tion of argument as an abstract objects, there is no mystery in statements such as “Anselm 
developed the ontological argument”, or “John created a very clever argument” and so on. 
10. KNOWLEDGE OF ARGUMENTS 
At this point we have discharged two of our argumentative obligations. We have shown 
(I), that arguments are abstract objects. We have also shown that it is not the case that 
(II). We have done this by showing that arguments are mind-dependent and temporal ab-
stract objects. We have yet to demonstrate that there is not some mysterious perceptual 
faculty that is needed in order to have knowledge of arguments and thus, we have not ex-
plained why realism need not rely on (III). It is not possible to here formulate a developed 
theory of how we have knowledge of arguments. However, this is not needed for our pur-
poses. What we do need to illustrate is that the states of affairs that make statements 
about arguments true have appropriate sorts of causal interactions with agents such that 
agents could know them. Hale claims that to poses knowledge of abstract objects,  
It will be enough if we can come to know the truth values of statements which ... involve ref-
erence to such objects. This will be consistent with any reasonable demand issuing from the 
causal conception of knowledge, provided that we are able to see the states of affairs in virtue 
of which such statements are true or false as situated within the ‘causal swim’ (as Wright puts 
it ...). (Hale 1987: 84)  
Thus, if the states of affairs that make statements about arguments true are within the 
‘causal swim’—that is, if the state of affairs are situated in the everyday world of causal 
interactions that we are familiar with—then that will satisfy any demand that the causal 
theory of knowledge might make on argument. Thus, in order to satisfy the demands of 
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the causal theory, we need to specify non-problematic states of affairs in virtue of which 
statements in which ‘argument’ figures as a singular expression are true or false. Given 
our identity-conditions for argument the sates of affairs that will make statements about 
arguments true or false involve facts about an agent’s intentions. Intending a proposition 
be inferred from another propositions in a particular way is a common phenomenon that 
is caught up in the ‘causal swim’. There are facts of the matter that are based on an 
agent’s mental states that determine what an agent’s intentions are. If Anselm intended 
the premises of his argument to provide inductive grounds for the conclusion “God ex-
ists,” then what we have come to call Anslem’s Ontological Argument would not actually 
be identical to the argument Anselm gave since in what we call Anslem’s Ontological Ar-
gument we do not intend the conclusion to follow inductively from premises. Thus, states 
of affairs in virtue of which statements about arguments are true or false are not somehow 
outside the causal swim. We can have direct cognitive acquaintances with these states of 
affairs. It, therefore, seems reasonable to think that, given our identity conditions for ar-
gument, it is possible to satisfy the demands of a causal theory of knowledge.  
11. CONCLUSION 
Our paper has accomplished two distinct tasks. First, we made the case that ‘argument’ is 
not ambiguous between, on the one hand, a speech act meaning and, on the other hand, an 
object meaning. Rather we contended that ‘argument’ has an abstract object literal mean-
ing. There are some natural objections that arise for this view. Since abstract objects are 
often thought of as mind-independent, non-spatiotemporal objects there are difficulties 
accounting for how we could create arguments, and there are difficulties accounting for 
how we come to know arguments. The second task we accomplished in this essay was to 
develop an account of arguments as abstract objects that addressed these difficulties. The 
account we developed understands arguments to be objects that can be spatially but not 
temporally separate and that are creations of human intellectual activity. We think that 
given (i) our positive account for why ‘argument’ refers to an abstract object, and given 
that (ii) we have developed an account of arguments as abstract objects that addresses the 
major concerns that such a view encounters, there is solid grounds to take seriously the 
idea that arguments are a sort of abstract object. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In “Arguments as Abstract Objects” Paul Simard-Smith and Andrei Moldovan set them-
selves two main tasks: first to argue that the term ‘argument’ is not subject to a certain sort 
of ambiguity and second to present their own view of arguments as abstract objects. The 
two tasks are mostly independent of each other. One could reject their case for the claim 
that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous in the relevant way, but still accept their account of ar-
guments as abstract objects. Alternatively one could accept their case for no ambiguity, but 
reject their account of arguments. In what follows I shall focus on their case for no ambigu-
ity, though at the end of this paper I pose some challenges for their account of arguments. 
2. AMBIGUITY 
Before I get to their case, however, it is important to try to understand exactly what it is 
they are making a case for—what exactly is the ambiguity that they claim does not apply 
to the term ‘argument’? I start quite generally and try to work my way down to their spe-
cific target. 
 Is ‘argument’ an ambiguous term in English? Yes. Consider: 
(1) Bob’s and Sally’s blistering argument made the kids scurry for cover. 
(2) When the argument for the squaring function is undefined, the result is undefined. 
(3) John Searle’s Chinese Room argument against strong AI is the most famous ar-
gument in the philosophy of mind. 
The word ‘argument’ in each sentence is used non-elliptically to refer to different kinds 
of entities. In general the contexts of use of these sentences are unrelated, just as the usual 
contexts of use are quite different for riverbanks and banking institutions. 
 But most, though certainly not all, argumentation theorists and writers of basic 
logic textbooks claim that while the use in (3) is within the domain of interest, the use in 
(1) is not. Presumably the use in (2), or the use of ‘argument’ in certain literary contexts, 
is specialized enough that mentioning (2) and then rejecting it is deemed more likely to 
confuse than illuminate.  
 Is ‘argument’, then, an ambiguous term within the domain of interest to argu-
mentation theorists?  Yes. And I suspect that Simard-Smith and Moldovan would agree. 
They admit that there is a debate sense of ‘argument’ such as in: 
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(4) The argument ranged back and forth until the final vote. 
and note that if “a debate is an act then ‘argument’ does instantiate the act/object ambigu-
ity.” Regardless of whether a debate is a complex act or not, it is certainly an activity, and 
so Simard-Smith and Moldovan admit at least to ‘argument’ being subject to an activi-
ty/object ambiguity.   
 But there is a more general activity sense of ‘argument’ that Simard-Smith and 
Moldovan do not mention. Consider: 
(5) He was right to resort to argument rather than intimidation. 
Presumably, as a type of activity there are instances that fall under that type. Some of those 
instances might be debates or disputes, but the particular activity intimated by (5) need not 
be a dispute or debate—it might simply be an instance of arguing by a single person. 
 But then one might claim that just as the general performance activity has many 
particular instances that are themselves performances, the general argument activity has 
many particular instances that are themselves arguments. At the very least one can stipu-
late that, for the purposes of argumentation theory, one is going to refer to the particular 
instances of the activity of argument as arguments. 
 Again, Simard-Smith and Moldovan, I suspect, would not disagree—they write: 
“the theorist is free to define her terms as she likes” (p. 12). But they go on: 
“[T]he disagreement in the literature on argumentation is surely not about some stipulative def-
initions. It is the meaning of the natural language word ‘argument’ that definitions offered in the 
literature try to capture, and not the meaning of a term within some theory or another.” (p. 12) 
I am not at all sure that they are right that the disagreement is about the meaning of the nat-
ural language word ‘argument’. After all, the motivation to generate theoretical precision 
might be the very confusions or inadequacies that appear to be a part of everyday discourse. 
Also the ultimate hope of the theoretician might be to generate a change of current usage.
1
 
Regardless, even if one of the parameters for judging theory adequacy is how close the use 
of theoretical terms matches the use of those terms in everyday discourse, there will quite 
likely be other parameters such as simplicity, consistency, etc. that can easily override de-
viations from common usage when considering the adequacy of the theory as a whole.  
 Regardless, at the very least the issue for Simard-Smith and Moldovan is not 
whether theoretical uses of the term ‘argument’ are ambiguous between an activity sense 
that also covers particular instances of that activity and an object sense, but rather wheth-
er the natural language or perhaps everyday or common usage of the term is ambiguous 
in some such way.  
                                                 
1  For example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), after giving a definition of “argumentation” that is 
in line with both other theorists’ definition of ‘argument’ and their earlier definition cited by Simard-
Smith and Moldovan (and which van Eemeren and Grootendorst claim maintains the “process-product” 
ambiguity), write: 
 “Although the definition is certainly in line with the way in which the word argumentation is used in 
ordinary usage, the meaning of the technical term argumentation is more precise, based on a conceptual 
analysis of the theoretical notion of argumentation. The definition given is stipulative in the sense that it 
introduces a specific, and to some extent new, convention of language use …”(p. 1). 
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 Simard-Smith and Moldovan also grant that there are everyday uses of the term 
‘argument’ that are about particular instances of the activity of arguing—specifically 
speech acts.  What they deny is that this usage implies that the term ‘argument’ is ambig-
uous between a speech act sense and an object sense of the term ‘argument’.  
 At this point one might be tempted to ask exactly what Simard-Smith and Mol-
dovan count as the meaning of a term, since if one holds that meaning is at least in part 
determined by use and the term has separate uses one might reasonably hold that the term 
has multiple meanings. Alternatively, given that the term appears to refer to different 
sorts of objects given different uses, if one holds that meaning is at least in part deter-
mined by reference, then again the different uses with different references seem to dictate 
that the term has multiple meanings. But other than the following very opaque comment 
about literal meaning—“Roughly speaking, it makes reference to the meaning of words in 
the lexicon, and whose knowledge is therefore a priori” (p. 3)—they give us nothing 
about what meanings are so that we can understand what exactly they are claiming when 
they say certain distinct uses of ‘argument’ do not imply distinct meanings.  
Even without an account of meaning, they argue that the speech act use and the proposi-
tional content use of ‘argument’ do not imply distinct meanings for the term ‘argument.’  
Their argument is that even when ‘argument’ is used in these two different ways, it fails 
to pass several tests for ambiguity available in the literature. The success of their argu-
ment then depends on either the adequacy of the tests or the adequacy of their claim that 
‘argument’ fails the test. 
 For example, Simard-Smith and Moldovan suggest that ‘argument’ fails the test 
of the superordinate sense because ‘argument’ in its abstract object sense and speech act 
sense can be replaced with ‘defense of the claim’ in various sentences without change in 
meaning. But one might argue that while lack of a candidate replacement expression is 
sufficient to establish ambiguity, the presence of such a candidate is not sufficient to es-
tablish lack of ambiguity. If the replacement expression, in this case ‘defense of the 
claim’ is also ambiguous in the same way, then ‘failing’ this test tells us nothing about 
whether the original term is or is not ambiguous. For example, suppose ‘statement’ and 
‘claim’ are both ambiguous between the content and the act of expressing that content. 
Since claim and statement are interchangeable without loss of meaning in many sentenc-
es, this test would judge neither ambiguous even though, by supposition, both are.  
 The second test is the contradiction test—whether a sentence can be both truly 
affirmed or denied in a given context. Simard-Smith and Moldovan show that the debate 
sense of argument passes this test, and then claim, “unless a different sentence containing 
‘argument’ is found, for which the respective judgments are possible, ‘argument’ fails to be 
speech act/abstract object ambiguous according to this test” (p. 8). Here then is one suggestion: 
 
(6) The argument was difficult to understand. 
 
This could be true because the speaker’s accent was very thick, but false because the con-
tent was quite straightforward, or true because the content was quite complex, but false 
because the enunciation was quite clear. Of course surrounding context might make 
which reading is intended obvious. For example, precede (6) with: 
(7) His accent was very thick 
G.C. GODDU 
4 
and you get the first true reading, even if the content is quite simple. Precede it with: 
 
(8) n-dimensional skew symmetric tensor functions are quite esoteric 
 
and you most likely get the second, even if the speaker’s enunciation is crystal clear. 
 Finally the zeugma test relies on competing, but distinct lexical meanings generating 
oddness when clauses sensitive to just one of the competing meanings are conjoined in a sin-
gle sentence. For example, Simard-Smith and Moldovan provide the following example: 
 
 (9) The newspaper fell off the table and fired the editor. 
 
They go on to claim that “it does not seem possible to obtain zeugma with ‘argument’: 
 
 (10) His argument was valid, but was so loud that the dog ran away. 
 
The predicate ‘loud’ selects for an event of the speech act kind, while ‘valid’ selects for 
the abstract informational object. Still there is no oddness in predicating both of ‘argu-
ment’ in the same sentence.” (p. 9) 
 But does ‘valid’ only select for the abstract informational object? It may be true 
that the primary bearer of validity is the set of propositions. But it could also be true that 
the speech act is valid in virtue of having expressed a valid set, just as we can legitimate-
ly say without oddness that someone spoke truly, even if one speaks truly in virtue of ut-
tering a sentence that expresses a true proposition. But then closely related uses of terms 
may share enough
2
 of the selecting expressions such that failing to pass the zeugma test 
would not necessarily indicate a lack of ambiguity.  
 Simard-Smith and Moldovan take failing the tests as prima facie evidence that ‘ar-
gument’ is not ambiguous between a speech act meaning and an abstract object meaning. But 
they also go on to present further evidence against the existence of a speech act sense. First, 
they claim, using a test proposed by Nicholas Asher, that the speech act reading is not always 
available for appropriate verbs that take events as arguments. Their examples are: 
 
 (11) Where did the argument take place? 
 (12) The argument was very loud. 
 
They claim (11) is not about “where the speech containing the argument took place” but 
rather “about where the debate took place.”  About (12) they claim it is “not heard as 
meaning that the voice of the arguer was very loud when he gave his argument, but rather 
that the dispute was very loud.” (p. 10) 
 Simard-Smith and Moldovan certainly point to one possible reading of those sen-
tences, but are the speech act readings really unavailable? Consider the following dialogue: 
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 But not necessarily all—there is for example no current legitimate application of ‘loud’ to abstract propo-
sitions, even derivatively. Whether there are any expressions that select solely for abtract propositional con-
tent without having a derivative sense that applies to expressions of that content is presumably a question 
that needs answering before Simard-Smith and Moldovan can appeal successfully to the zeugma test. 
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 A:  Charles went through with it—he argued that the mayor is a corrupt fool. 
 B:  Oh, no!  Where did the argument take place? 
 A:  Right in the city square, on market day. 
 B:  Maybe no one heard him? 
 A:  Everyone heard him all right—the argument was very loud. 
 
In this dialogue, (11) and (12) do ask about where the speech containing the argument 
took place and whether it was loud enough to be heard or not. 
 Second, Simard-Smith and Moldovan claim that “‘argument’ can be used to re-
fer to a great variety of acts and events, apart from speech acts” and that “it seems that 
there is no finite list of such readings.” They go on to claim that if each such reading en-
coded a literal meaning, then “one can never have knowledge of all the meanings that 
‘argument’ has, and so one could never acquire linguistic competence with the word ‘ar-
gument’” (pp. 10-11). 
 I am not convinced. Are there really a non-finite number of act types distinct 
from speech acts that count as arguments? If not, then we could acquire linguistic compe-
tence. But even if the number is infinite, that just means we could never be fully compe-
tent with the term. But why would lacking full linguistic competence be a problem, as 
long as we could competently use the distinct meanings we did know? 
 More generally, given that Simard-Smith’s and Moldovan’s tests and arguments 
are at least inconclusive, I am not convinced that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous between a 
speech act sense and an object sense, at least in the following way. ‘Argument’ clearly 
sometimes means the general activity of arguing. There are many particular instances of 
this activity. In many cases, the term ‘argument’ is used to pick out these particular in-
stances—instances that include not only debates between individuals, but complex speech 
acts made by single individuals.
3
 Perhaps this is not enough to show that ‘argument’ has a 
literal speech act meaning, but that just returns us to an earlier problem—Simard-Smith 
and Moldovan provide no clear notion of what literal meanings are or what it takes for a 
term to have multiple meanings. 
3. ARGUMENTS AS ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
If I were forced to pick a single ontological category for the term ‘argument’, say as part 
of full argumentation theory, I would pick abstract object. In this minimal sense then, 
Simard-Smith and Moldovan and I agree. But even so, for the argumentative purposes in 
the paper of mine that Simard-Smith and Moldovan use as a catalyst for their discussion 
here, I could remain agnostic about the actual nature of abstract objects—all that I require 
there is that whatever sorts of things arguments as objects are, they are not generally, or 
even mostly, the product of the activity of arguing. 
 Despite my agnosticism I do have some concerns for the particular account of 
arguments as abstract objects that Simard-Smith and Moldovan give. I conclude this pa-
                                                 
3  The fact that we are talking about instances falling under a general type might explain Simard-Smith’s and 
Moldovan’s intuition that the acts and event readings of ‘argument’ is open-ended. We just cannot say in ad-
vance all the particular types of acts that might fall under the general activity of arguing. At the very least, ar-
gumentation theorists certainly do not agree about what types of acts fall under the general activity of argu-
ing. For example, Michael Gilbert (2003) claims a judo flip can be an act of arguing and so an argument. 
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per with an articulation of some of those concerns in the form of four challenges. If 
Simard-Smith and Moldovan can meet these challenges, then their account of arguments 
should be stronger for it. 
 
Challenge 1: The proposed minimal criterion for distinguishing abstract and concrete ob-
jects in terms of spatial separation is inadequate. Time travel scenarios to the local past are 
generally considered to be at least conceptually coherent. If I travel five years into the past, 
then I will be located in two different places at once, but am not thereby an abstract object. 
 
Challenge 2: Are games, as abstract objects, really located in multiple places? Particular 
instances of a game of chess are located in different places, but those are different partic-
ular, concrete events. In addition to the particular concrete chess event that is present in a 
particular location is there also an abstract object present at that location? Of course, the 
same question holds for musical compositions or arguments. 
 
Challenge 3: Simard-Smith and Moldovan seem to have two kinds of abstract objects in 
play—those that are atemporal and non-spatial such as mathematical objects and sets and 
those that are temporal and spatially multiply located such as games, musical composi-
tions, and according to their proposal, arguments. But arguments contain propositions as 
constituents. What kind of abstract objects are they? Did the content of Anselm’s argu-
ment come into existence because of Anselm or not? Can the content go out of existence? 
Certainly the content can stop being expressed, and in that sense, stop being instantiated, 
but is that the same as going out of existence? In order to keep their claims about a causal 
theory of knowledge applying to arguments intact they would need to say propositions 
are subject to human knowledge. Does that mean that propositions are temporal objects? 
Or if not, do Simard-Smith and Moldovan have an account of how we can know mathe-
matical and propositional abstract objects? If so, then one of the primary motivations for 
treating arguments as temporal abstract objects disappears. 
 
Challenge 4: What exactly is meant by saying that arguments are not temporally separat-
ed? Anselm intends a specific conclusion to be inferred from a specific set of premise 
propositions. But suppose this intention is never expressed on paper or recorded. I have 
the same intention over the same propositions 800 years later. Did the argument exist in 
the intervening 800 years or not? 
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